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IMAGINARY THREATS TO 
GOVERNMENT’S EXPRESSIVE 
INTERESTS 
Helen Norton† 
INTRODUCTION 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the government must speak 
in a wide variety of ways if it is to function effectively.1 Government 
expression also serves valuable First Amendment interests in enabling 
members of the public to identify and assess their government’s 
priorities, thus informing and facilitating the public’s participation in 
democratic self-governance.2 For these reasons, the Court’s 
government speech doctrine exempts the government’s own speech 
from free speech clause scrutiny.3  
                                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I am grateful to 
participants’ insightful contributions at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law 
Symposium, Government Speech: The Government’s Ability to Compel and Restrict Speech. 
Thanks too to Al Canner for very thoughtful comments, and to Jordan Bunch for excellent 
research assistance. Special thanks to the Case Western Reserve University Law Review staff 
for its exceptional work in organizing an outstanding conference. 
1 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view on (in 
modern times, at least) innumerable subjects—which is the main reason we have decided to 
elect those who run the government, rather than save money by making their posts hereditary.”); 
see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 723 (1965) 
(“Now it is evident that government must itself talk and write and even listen.”); Robert C. Post, 
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1825 (1987) (“[I]t is probably not too outlandish an exaggeration to 
conclude that government organizations would grind to a halt were the Court seriously to 
prohibit viewpoint discrimination in the internal management of speech.”). 
2 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970) 
(“Participation by the government in the system of freedom of expression is an essential feature 
of any democratic society. It enables the government to inform, explain, and persuade—
measures especially crucial in a society that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of 
force. Government participation also greatly enriches the system; it provides the facts, ideas, 
and expertise not available from other sources.”). 
3 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (“The Free Speech 
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government 
speech.”); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) (characterizing 
government’s own speech as “exempt from First Amendment scrutiny”). 
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But what does this mean in practice? More specifically, how can 
government protect its legitimate—and, indeed, valuable—expressive 
interests from encroachment without running afoul of the First 
Amendment’s free speech protections for private speakers? As the 
Court has held, the First Amendment permits the government to 
refuse to allow other parties to join, and thus change or distort, its 
own message—i.e., private speakers cannot compel the government 
to deliver their own views.4  
Too often, however, governmental bodies are asserting their own 
expressive interests to claim—and some courts are permitting them to 
exercise—the power to punish private parties’ speech that does not 
threaten the government’s ability to express its own views. For 
example, some federal courts have relied on government speech 
interests to justify the exclusion of peaceful dissenters from 
attendance at the government’s public functions,5 and another has 
invoked government’s expressive interests to justify the punishment 
of student expression in public schools.6 By identifying such 
troubling examples, this essay urges attention to, and concern for, this 
trend’s potential spread.  
This is only the most recent disquieting development to emerge 
from the Supreme Court’s “recently minted government speech 
doctrine.”7 As I have written elsewhere, the Court “has been too 
quick to defer to public entities’ assertions that contested speech is 
their own; indeed, it has yet to deny the government’s claim to speech 
in the face of a competing private claim.”8 As just one example, the 
                                                                                                                 
4 See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 (characterizing a town’s decision about which 
monuments to display in its park as the government’s own expressive choice, such that it was 
free to decline displays that it considered inconsistent with its own message); see also Page v. 
Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the government 
speech doctrine permits a school board to announce its opposition to pending voucher 
legislation on its website without requiring it to post the plaintiff’s pro-voucher materials as 
well); Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
government speech doctrine permits the government to present a holiday message to citizens 
without incurring a constitutional obligation to incorporate the message of dissenting private 
parties); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the government speech doctrine permits a school district to post materials celebrating Gay 
and Lesbian Awareness Month on its bulletin boards without requiring it to post a teacher’s anti-
gay materials as well).  
5 See, e.g., Weise v. Casper, 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7 
(2010); Weise v. Casper, No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS, 2008 WL 4838682, at *7–8 (D. Colo. 
Nov. 6, 2008). 
6  See, e.g., Doe v. Silsbee Ind. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
79 U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011). 
7 Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
8 Helen Norton, Shining a Light on Democracy’s Dark Lagoon, 61 S.C. L. REV. 535, 536 
(2010); see also Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. 
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Court has been far too willing to permit the government to control the 
speech of its workers to protect its own asserted expressive interests.9 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,10 the Court held that public employees’ 
speech made “pursuant to their official duties” receives no First 
Amendment protection because the government should be permitted 
to “exercise . . . employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created.”11 It thus rejected the First Amendment 
claim of a prosecutor disciplined after writing an internal 
memorandum critical of the police.12 
The Court’s willingness to permit government control over public 
employees’ expression by characterizing such speech as the 
government’s own for which it has paid a salary—regardless of that 
expression’s value to the public—has deeply disturbing implications 
not only for government workers’ free speech rights, but also for the 
public’s access to information about its government’s effectiveness.13 
Indeed, lower courts now routinely apply Garcetti to reject First 
Amendment claims by police officers terminated for challenging 
public officials’ illegal behavior, financial managers discharged for 
reporting fiscal improprieties, police officers fired for reporting health 
and safety violations, and health care workers punished for expressing 
concerns about patient care.14  
                                                                                                                 
 
L. REV. 899, 902 (2010) (“Deference to government, more than any other principle, seems to 
explain” the Court’s government speech determinations.).  
9 As another example of the Court’s willingness to defer to government’s 
characterization of contested speech as its own, it has also failed to require government to 
identify itself publicly as the source of a message as a condition of claiming the government 
speech defense to a First Amendment claim. See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 578 n.8 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“Notably, the Court nowhere addresses how, or even whether, the benefits of 
allowing government to mislead taxpayers by concealing its sponsorship of expression outweigh 
the additional imposition on First Amendment rights that results from it. Indeed, the Court 
describes no benefits from its approach and gives no reason to think First Amendment doctrine 
should accommodate the Government’s subterfuge.”).  
10 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
11 Id. at 421–22. 
12 Id. at 424. 
13 See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its 
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2009) (discussing the 
current judicial environment and its implications for public employee’s First Amendment 
claims). 
14 See id. at 4–5 and 14–15 (detailing examples); see also Norton & Citron, supra note 8, 
at 912 (offering additional examples of lower courts’ application of Garcetti to dispose of public 
employees’ First Amendment claims). A few judges, however, have resisted this trend by 
seeking to limit Garcetti’s reach—and its often disturbing consequences—by taking a hard look 
at whether a public employee’s contested speech actually occurred pursuant to her official job 
duties. See, e.g., Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 205 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi, J., 
dissenting) (urging “a less expansive definition of speech” pursuant to public employees’ 
official duties when deciding whether Garcetti applies); Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d at 272 
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As just one illustration of the post-Garcetti landscape, consider the 
Eighth Circuit’s recent rejection of a First Amendment claim by 
Omaha’s Public Safety Auditor, who was fired after she published a 
report that urged improvement in the police department’s 
performance in certain areas.15 The report “describe[d], by analyzing 
traffic stop complaints, how the [Omaha Police Department] finds 
itself currently estranged from many of the communities it serves and 
offers suggestions about how it can repair those relations.”16 The 
Eighth Circuit found the report to be unprotected speech under 
Garcetti because such expression was part of the auditor’s official 
duties to review citizen complaints against the city’s public safety 
agencies.17 In other words, Garcetti means that even truthful 
expression by a government worker on a matter of great public 
importance is entirely unprotected when—and, indeed, because—the 
worker is simply doing her job.18  
Garcetti and its progeny thus exemplify a government speech 
doctrine increasingly unmoored from its theoretical underpinnings—
one that fails to recognize that the constitutional value of government 
speech is rooted entirely in its ability to further, rather than frustrate, 
the government’s accountability to its electorate. The remainder of 
this essay identifies and explores new and related developments, as 
some lower courts now rely on government speech rationales to limit 
free speech rights far outside of the public employment context. These 
cases feature courts that are disturbingly quick to define the 
government’s expressive interests extremely broadly, and quicker still 
to perceive private individuals’ speech as threatening those interests. 
In short, although government has a substantial interest in protecting 
its ability to communicate its own views, these courts have been all 
too willing to imagine threats to that interest where none exist.  
                                                                                                                 
 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (observing that courts’ failure carefully to scrutinize whether 
contested speech was actually delivered pursuant to a public employee’s official duties and thus 
unprotected by Garcetti “would have profound adverse effects on accountability in 
government”). 
15 Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2010). 
16 Id. at 589. 
17 Id. at 592–93. 
18 Judge Rovner powerfully described this dynamic when reluctantly concurring in the 
Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the First Amendment does not protect a police officer’s 
reports that his supervisor was engaged in unlawful activity because the officer’s statement was 
made pursuant to his official duties: “Detective Kolatski was performing his job admirably at 
the time of these events, and although his demotion for truthfully reporting allegations of 
misconduct may be morally repugnant, after Garcetti it does not offend the First Amendment.” 
Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2007) (Rovner, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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I: GOVERNMENT’S EFFORTS TO EXCLUDE  
DISSENTING ATTENDEES FROM PUBLIC FUNCTIONS TO  
PROTECT ITS ASSERTED EXPRESSIVE INTERESTS 
Some public entities have aggressively asserted—and some courts 
have accepted—government speech interests to justify the exclusion 
of non-disruptive dissenters from attendance at the government’s 
expressive public functions.19 These developments reveal a troubling 
misunderstanding of what the government speech doctrine does, and 
does not, empower government to do to protect its expressive 
interests, and a distressing failure to recall that the First Amendment 
requires the government’s toleration of peaceful dissent.20  
That government acts as both regulator and speaker (along with its 
many other roles, such as employer, educator, property owner, etc.) 
does not mean that we cannot parse those roles when assessing the 
constitutionality of its action.21 Although we should be slow to 
                                                                                                                 
19 First Circuit Judge Torruella presciently anticipated this development in an earlier 
government speech case. See Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 337 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(Torruella, J., dissenting) (“The majority's position has the potential of permitting a 
governmental entity to engage in viewpoint discrimination in its own governmentally-owned 
channels so long as the governmental entity can cast its actions as its own speech after the fact. 
What is to stop a governmental entity from applying the doctrine to a parade? Or official 
events? It is nearly impossible to concoct examples of viewpoint discrimination on government 
channels that cannot otherwise be repackaged ex post as ‘government speech.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
20 The protection of peaceful dissent furthers the values most often identified at the heart 
of the First Amendment, which include protecting individual interests in autonomy and self-
expression, facilitating citizen participation in democratic self-government, and contributing to 
the discovery of truth and the development of knowledge. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, The Perils 
of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1411 (1987) (“Most theoretical writings have suggested variants of four 
different values as critical to speech protection: individual development, democratic 
government, social stability, and truth.” (footnotes omitted)). 
Indeed, the developments described in this essay illustrate Mark Yudof’s great fear—
expressed in his groundbreaking work on government speech—that government would use its 
own speech to falsify consent by excluding dissent. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT 
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 15 (1983). For more 
contemporary concerns that the Court’s government speech doctrine may facilitate the 
suppression of dissent, see Joseph Blocher, Government Viewpoint and Government Speech, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011) (arguing that the government speech doctrine rewards viewpoint 
discrimination); Timothy Zick, Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum, 
2010 BYU L. REV. 2203 (encouraging courts and officials to avoid many of the potentially 
troubling implications of Summum). 
21 The government is unique among all speakers—indeed, among all actors—because of 
its coercive power as sovereign. To be sure, however, there remains a meaningful distinction 
between government expression and government coercion. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Right 
Labels, Wrong Categories: Some Comments on Steven D. Smith’s, Why is Government Speech 
Problematic?, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 12, 2010, 9:14AM), http://www.denver 
lawreview.org/government-speech/ (“First Amendment doctrine appropriately distinguishes 
between these two scenarios because the government’s own speech can rarely influence the 
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assume that government expression is inevitably coercive given the 
considerable instrumental value of transparently governmental 
speech,22 we should be slower still to excuse government’s 
punishment of private expression as an acceptable means of 
protecting its expressive interests. Yet some courts have displayed a 
disconcerting willingness to defer to government’s claim that it may 
engage in coercion to protect its expression. 
For example, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in 
Weise v. Casper,23 a case in which the lower courts expressly invoked 
government speech concerns to justify the exclusion of nondisruptive 
private citizens from an official governmental function based simply 
on their dissenting views.24 Weise involved a First Amendment 
challenge by two individuals who were forcibly ejected from 
President Bush’s speech on Social Security that was otherwise open 
to the public simply because they arrived at the event’s parking lot in 
a car with a “No More Blood for Oil” bumper sticker.25 As described 
by the Tenth Circuit on appeal, “Sometime before the President’s 
speech, the White House Advance Office established a policy of 
excluding those who disagree with the President from the President’s 
official public appearances.”26 
The federal district court found no constitutional violation, using 
language that suggests a vivid imagination with respect to threats to 
government’s expressive interests: “Plaintiffs [sic] complaint is 
essentially that they were not permitted to participate in the 
President’s speech. President Bush had the right, at his own speech, to 
ensure that only his message was conveyed. When the President 
speaks, he may choose his own words.”27  
                                                                                                                 
 
public debate in the same qualitative or quantitative way as when it excludes private speakers’ 
ideas from the marketplace.”). 
22 See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2000) 
(explaining that government persuasion is distinguishable from government coercion). 
23 593 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 7 (2010). 
24  Weise v. Casper, No. 05-cv-02355-WYD-CBS, 2008 WL 4838682, at *7–8 (D. Colo. 
Nov. 6, 2008). 
25 Id. at *1-2.  
26 Weise, 593 F.3d at 1165.  
27 Weise, 2008 WL 4838682, at *8 (emphasis omitted). The district court then cited a 
Tenth Circuit government speech case, Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132 1143 
(10th Cir. 2001), which held that the government speech doctrine permits the government to 
present a holiday message to citizens without incurring a constitutional obligation to incorporate 
the message of dissenting private parties. Id. at *8. But unlike the plaintiff in Wells (who sought 
to require the city to include her message objecting to government endorsement of the holidays 
in its public holiday display), the Weise plaintiffs did not seek to have the President or any other 
government speaker incorporate a dissenting message of their own.  
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True enough. But the plaintiffs in no way threatened that choice. 
They did not seek to participate in the President’s speech or to 
interfere with his chosen message. They sought only to listen to it—
and to ask a question if questions were permitted28 Indeed, although 
the government speech doctrine certainly permits President Bush to 
control the content of his own speech and to refuse to share the 
event’s podium and microphone with dissenters (or any other 
speakers), his expressive interests are in no way threatened by the 
mere presence of those who may disagree with his views.  
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims on qualified immunity grounds, 
citing—inter alia—the Supreme Court’s most recent government 
speech decision, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, before concluding 
that the law is not clearly established as to “how to treat the ejection 
of a silent attendee from an official speech based on the attendee’s 
protected expression outside the speech area.”29 In other words, the 
appellate court suggested that the emergence of the government 
speech doctrine sufficiently muddied the legal waters to uphold the 
defendants’ qualified immunity claim:  
 At the most general level, Plaintiffs are correct that the 
government usually cannot discriminate against a speaker 
based on that speaker’s viewpoint. But in qualified immunity 
cases, except in the most obvious cases, broad, general 
propositions of law are insufficient to suggest clearly 
established law. That is because the clearly established law 
must be such that it would put a reasonable official on notice 
that his conduct was unlawful. That is particularly true here. 
Beyond the abstract principle that the government ordinarily 
cannot discriminate based upon viewpoint, however, a First 
Amendment claim must be situated somewhere within the 
free speech jurisprudence because we accord speech various 
levels of protection depending upon the nature of the speech, 
the speaker, and the setting. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum . . . (because government speech ‘is not subject to 
                                                                                                                 
28 Weise, 593 F.3d at 1165–66 (“Plaintiffs claim that they never disrupted the event, 
intended to disrupt the event, or indicated that they would disrupt the event. [One of the 
plaintiffs] would have asked the President a question, if given the opportunity.” (citation 
omitted)). 
29 Id. at 1170. 
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the Free Speech Clause,’ the government as speaker can 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint).30  
. . . . 
 . . . To be sure, in some obvious situations, general 
authority may put a reasonable public official on notice that 
his or her conduct is violative of constitutional rights. This is 
not one of them.31 
But as Judge Holloway made clear in a vigorous and well-
reasoned dissent, this should have been an easy win for the plaintiffs:  
On what basis could a representative of the executive branch 
have thought, on seeing Plaintiffs alight from Ms. Weise’s car 
with its bumper sticker, that they could be excluded from a 
public event solely because Ms. Weise had chosen to exercise 
her most fundamental First Amendment right outside of the 
event and in the complete absence of any indication that 
Plaintiffs intended to even speak at the event, much less any 
indication of any intent to disrupt the event?32 
Justice Ginsburg echoed this bewilderment in her dissent from the 
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari (joined by Justice Sotomayor): “I 
cannot see how reasonable public officials, or any staff or volunteers 
under their direction, could have viewed the bumper sticker as a 
permissible reason for depriving [the plaintiffs] of access to the 
event.”33  
Other public officials have offered similarly expansive arguments 
in defense of their efforts to exclude potential dissenters from public 
functions. For example, in Liberty & Prosperity 1776, Inc. v. 
Corzine,34 the governor of New Jersey asserted a government speech 
defense to excuse the exclusion and arrest of dissenters from a town 
hall meeting at a high school auditorium where he proposed to present 
a financial restructuring and debt reduction plan to town citizens for 
                                                                                                                 
30 Id. at 1167–68 (citations omitted). 
31 Id. at 1170.  
32 Id. at 1175 (Holloway, J., dissenting). 
33 Weise v. Casper, 131 S. Ct. 7, 7 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also 
noted, however, that this particular suit (in which the defendants were volunteers rather than 
government employees) could be distinguished from still-pending suits against the White House 
officials alleged to have ordered the ejection—suits that “may offer this Court an opportunity to 
take up the issue avoided today.” Id. at 8. 
34  720 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. N.J. 2010). 
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their feedback.35 The governor had permitted a nonprofit organization 
supportive of his plan (Save Our State) to set up registration tables, 
display literature and signs, and place a banner over the auditorium’s 
stage.36 The city police advised the plaintiffs (who opposed the 
governor’s plan), however, that they could not peacefully display 
signs or distribute literature in the auditorium or on the facility’s 
grounds, and arrested the plaintiffs when they did so.37 In his motion 
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, the governor 
asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity because he 
adopted the speech of Save Our State, transforming it into 
government speech. . . . The premise of the argument is that 
by adopting Save Our State’s speech, it not only transformed 
Save Our State’s speech into government speech, it also 
eliminated any security or disruption risks posed by Save Our 
State’s displaying of signs and distributing of literature, such 
that the Court could find that those content-neutral rationales 
and not viewpoint-discrimination explained the restriction on 
Plaintiffs’ identical behavior.38 
The federal district court appropriately rejected the governor’s 
argument and denied his motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment claim.39 In so holding, it recognized that the government 
speech doctrine empowers the governor to control the podium or the 
microphone at his official events,40 but not to exclude non-disruptive 
private parties with different views who posed no threat to his ability 
to deliver his governmental message:  
 The Governor could, for example, invite the President of 
Save Our State to introduce him at the meeting without also 
permitting [the plaintiff] to give some opening remarks. As in 
this case, the Governor could also hang the Save Our State 
banner above the stage, and perhaps permit only Save Our 
State to set up registration tables.  
                                                                                                                 
35 Id. at 624–25. 
36 Id. at 625. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 630-31. 
39  Id. at 633. 
40 Id. (“The discriminatory treatment of who may hang a banner on the stage is 
permissible because the existence of a limited public forum does not itself give any speaker the 
right to get up on stage during another speaker’s time, or to otherwise become a part of the 
organizing speaker’s message.”). 
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 However, in this case, the State is actually asking for 
something more than what a private speaker would be entitled 
to: the ability not just to control its own speech and prevent 
disruption, but the ability to exclude even peaceful, non-
disruptive dissent that does not confuse or impair the 
government’s message. 
. . . . 
 Holding signs and distributing leaflets at a state-sponsored 
rally is not the same as directly participating in the message 
being expressed in the rally. And therefore the right of the 
government to control its message does not extend to control 
over that dissenting speech.41  
The government speech doctrine empowers the government to 
choose certain messages as its own, but not to ensure the absence of 
those with dissenting views from its expressive functions (especially 
through their forcible ejection or arrest, as occurred in these cases). In 
both Weise and Corzine, the government’s message was transparently 
governmental: President Bush could make clear his views on Social 
Security, and Governor Corzine his views on financial restructuring. 
In neither case did the presence of peaceful dissenters threaten the 
delivery of those views. Yet, in both cases, the government claimed 
more power than the government speech doctrine provides it.  
The government speech doctrine provides public entities with a 
defense to free speech claims by private speakers who seek to join, 
alter, or otherwise interfere with the government’s delivery of its own 
views. But in neither case did the plaintiffs seek any such thing. In 
Weise, the plaintiffs did not seek to share the microphone nor the 
podium with the President, but instead sought merely to listen. In 
Corzine, the plaintiffs did not seek to require the government to print 
out literature expressing their dissenting views, nor to reserve them an 
auditorium for their own press conference; instead, they sought 
merely to attend the event and peacefully distribute their own 
literature. Only in Corzine, however, did the court take appropriate 
care to determine whether, if at all, a private speaker would 
undermine the government’s ability to deliver its own views, 
carefully attending to whether the dissenting speech would in fact 
“interfere or be confused with” that of the government.42  
                                                                                                                 
41 Id. at 633–34 (footnote omitted). 
42 Id. at 634 (“It does not follow from Hurley or its logic that the rightful temporary 
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II: GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF STUDENT SPEECH TO  
PROTECT ITS ASSERTED EXPRESSIVE INTERESTS 
Next consider the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision upholding a 
public school’s punishment of student speech, which illustrates yet 
another context in which lower courts have invoked government’s 
expressive interests to scuttle private speakers’ First Amendment 
claims. In Doe v. Silsbee Independent School District,43 the court 
considered a public high school student’s First Amendment challenge 
to her dismissal from the cheerleading squad when she failed to cheer 
for a basketball player who she alleged had sexually assaulted her.44 
(Rather than cheering, she folded her arms and remained silent when 
the player in question was at the free throw line.)45 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that public school 
students do not shed their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse 
gates,46 even while making clear that those rights are not coextensive 
with those of adults in other settings in light of the practical realities 
of the school environment.47 Indeed, the Court has recognized 
students’ (and other individuals’) strong expressive interest in not 
being compelled by the government to speak in a way contrary to 
their values.48 Along these lines, requiring an individual to cheer for 
                                                                                                                 
 
occupier of the limited public forum may exclude from the forum all competing messages of 
any kind, regardless of whether they would interfere or be confused with the speech of the 
organizer. . . . The Court has no reason to believe that government’s power should be greater 
than that of a private speaker in these circumstances.”).  
43 402 F. App’x 852 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011).  
44 According to news reports, the athlete later “pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of 
misdemeanor assault. He was fined $2,500 and ordered to perform 150 hours of community 
service and take an anger-management course.” Bob Egelko, Cheerleader Suit Tackles Students’ 
Rights Issue, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 2010, at A1. 
45 Id. 
46 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
47 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (explaining that First 
Amendment rights must be applied in light of the special circumstances found in schools); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (explaining that the same latitude 
given to an adult using an offensive form of expression to make a political point is not 
necessarily extended to children in public schools). 
48 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not permit a state to compel an objecting private speaker to display the state’s 
motto on his car’s license plate); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943) (holding that the First Amendment does not permit public schools to compel objecting 
students to salute the flag). Recall that one of the First Amendment’s primary purposes in 
protecting speech from government constraint is to preserve individuals’ interest in autonomy 
and self-expression. See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 
68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (“Over the years, we have come to view freedom of 
expression as essential to: (1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) the advance of knowledge and the 
discovery of truth; (3) participation in decisionmaking by all members of society; and 
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her alleged attacker offers an unusually powerful example of an 
action repugnant to individual autonomy. But in a per curiam opinion 
by Judges Clement, Garza, and Owen, the Fifth Circuit panel made no 
mention of that interest, emphasizing instead the school’s expressive 
interests and characterizing the plaintiff as “contractually required to 
cheer for the basketball team.”49 It then rejected her First Amendment 
claim in a single paragraph: 
In her capacity as cheerleader, H.S. served as a mouthpiece 
through which [the school] could disseminate speech-namely, 
support for its athletic teams. Insofar as the First Amendment 
does not require schools to promote particular student speech, 
[the school] had no duty to promote H.S.’s message by 
allowing her to cheer or not cheer, as she saw fit. Moreover, 
this act constituted substantial interference with the work of 
the school because, as a cheerleader, H.S. was at the 
basketball game for the purpose of cheering, a position she 
undertook voluntarily.50  
The Fifth Circuit’s cursory discussion variously alluded to Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,51 Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier,52 and the government speech doctrine to 
support its ruling. But none of these doctrines provides sufficient 
justification to dismiss the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, 
especially when we remain attentive to the constitutional purposes 
underlying each. The remainder of this Part considers each in turn.  
A. Government Speech 
Although the Silsbee opinion never directly mentioned the term 
“government speech,” nor did it cite to any government speech 
decision, the Fifth Circuit’s reference to the school’s interest in 
disseminating speech through the cheerleader-as-mouthpiece53 
indicates a focus on the school’s power to protect its own expression. 
To be sure, public schools—like other government entities—have a 
                                                                                                                 
 
(4) maintenance of the proper balance between stability and change.”).  
49 Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 853 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011).  
50 Id. at 855. 
51 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
52 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
53 Silsbee, 402 F. App’x at 855. 
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wide variety of views to communicate, and the government speech 
doctrine appropriately permits them to protect that expression from 
distortion by private speakers. Examples include a school district’s 
decision to express its opposition to pending school voucher 
legislation on its website and in e-mails and letters to parents and 
school employees,54 as well as a school district’s expression of 
support for Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month celebrations through 
postings on its bulletin boards.55 In both cases, federal appellate 
courts applied the government speech doctrine to reject First 
Amendment claims by private speakers who sought to require the 
schools to alter their own message by delivering or posting the 
plaintiffs’ contrary views on the school’s website, bulletin boards, and 
letters to parents and employees.56 As the Ninth Circuit explained,  
The narrow question we must answer is whether the First 
Amendment compels a public high school to share the 
podium with a teacher with antagonistic and contrary views 
when the school speaks to its own constituents on the subject 
of how students should behave towards each other while in 
school. The answer to this question clearly is no.57  
But even if the Fifth Circuit meant to apply the government speech 
doctrine to the facts in Silsbee, whether the plaintiff’s silence 
undermined the school’s expressive interest in supporting its athletic 
teams is not at all clear, and deserves careful examination. Here, the 
plaintiff did not seek to have the school express support for, or help 
her deliver, her own opinions. She did not demand that the school 
post her views on its website or bulletin boards nor include her 
message in its letters to students and employees. She simply declined 
to cheer. 
Yet the Fifth Circuit engaged in no such analysis; instead it 
permitted the school to protect its own expressive interests by 
controlling—even compelling—her speech. In so doing, perhaps the 
panel sought to treat students who engage in certain roles as akin to 
                                                                                                                 
54  Page v. Lexington Cnty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 278–79 (4th Cir. 2008). 
55 Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000).  
56 Page, 531 F.3d at 281–85 (holding that the First Amendment did not require the school 
district to post the plaintiff’s pro-voucher materials on its website, which announced the 
school’s opposition to pending voucher legislation, while emphasizing that the First 
Amendment would not permit the government to punish dissenters for expressing their views on 
their own websites); Downs, 228 F.3d at 1013-14 (holding that the First Amendment did not 
require the school district to permit the plaintiff to post materials questioning homosexuality’s 
morality on school bulletin boards celebrating Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month).  
57 Downs, 228 F.3d at 1005. 
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public employees under Garcetti—i.e., as speakers whose expression 
pursuant to their “official” (here, cheerleading) duties is unprotected 
by the First Amendment and thus entirely within the school’s 
control.58 More specifically, the panel’s reference to the plaintiff as 
“contractually required to cheer”59 and “as a mouthpiece through 
which [the school] could disseminate speech”60 is reminiscent of the 
Garcetti Court’s characterization of public employees’ speech 
“pursuant to [their] official duties” as speech that “the employer itself 
has commissioned or created” and is thus permitted to control without 
running afoul of the First Amendment.61 Just as we saw in Garcetti,62 
the Silsbee court appears to impose a formalistic bright-line rule to 
dispose of a plaintiff’s First Amendment claims rather than engage in 
the “often-challenging but entirely commonplace task of balancing 
constitutional interests.”63 In both cases, the courts were entirely too 
quick to defer to government’s purported expressive interests without 
any discussion of whether the plaintiff’s speech actually threatened 
those interests, much less any consideration of the plaintiff’s 
considerable countervailing free speech interests. 
 
                                                                                                                 
58 See Silsbee, 402 F. App’x at 855 (“[A]s a cheerleader, H.S. was at the basketball game 
for the purpose of cheering, a position she undertook voluntarily.”). 
59  Id. at 853. 
60  Id. at 855. 
61 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 401, 421–22 (2006). That Garcetti’s effects have the 
potential to spread in this way is further supported by various courts’ past willingness to extend 
First Amendment doctrine governing public employees’ speech to the expression of students 
and private speakers who engage in contractual and other relationships with public entities. See, 
e.g., Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2495 (2007) 
(relying on public employee precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of a 
private school that had voluntarily joined a governmental athletic association); Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674–76 (1996) (relying on public-employee speech 
precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of an independent contractor); 
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596–98 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on public-employee speech 
precedents for guidance in assessing First Amendment claims of student-athletes); Decotiis v. 
Whittemore, 680 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 n.2 (D. Me. 2010) (relying on public-employee speech 
precedents for guidance in assessing the First Amendment claims of a government contractor); 
see also Nicole B. Cásarez, The Student Press, the Public Workplace, and Expanding Notions of 
Government Speech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 1, 7 (2008) (noting parallel developments in the Court’s 
First Amendment doctrines governing public employee and student speech). 
62 See 547 U.S. at 421 (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”).  
63 Norton, supra note 13, at 33. 
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B. Analysis under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent  
Community School District 
In Tinker, the Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to 
permit public schools to regulate student speech at school that 
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder” or 
“would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of 
the school.”64  
Of the Court’s various rules governing public schools’ ability to 
regulate student speech, Tinker is by far the least deferential to the 
government.65 In Tinker, the Court made clear that the school’s 
interest must be “more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”66 
Instead, the school must show that the regulated speech is reasonably 
likely to “materially and substantially interfere with the requirements 
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”67 Applying 
this rule, the Court found that a school could not make such a 
showing with respect to students wearing black armbands at school in 
protest of the Vietnam War, and held their discipline to be a First 
Amendment violation.68 
Although the Fifth Circuit does not say so explicitly, its conclusion 
in Silsbee that the plaintiff’s act “constituted substantial interference 
with the work of the school”69 suggests that it intended to apply 
Tinker’s substantial interference test to the cheerleader’s expression. 
If so, however, its Tinker analysis is enormously, and inappropriately, 
                                                                                                                 
64 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
65 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007) (interpreting the First 
Amendment to permit schools to “restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is 
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (interpreting the First Amendment to permit schools to regulate 
students’ lewd and vulgar speech at an official assembly). Neither Fraser nor Morse require 
schools to justify their actions by showing that student speech on those topics was or would be 
disruptive. 
66 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see also id. at 508–09 (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear 
or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. 
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the 
majority’s opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the 
campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a 
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is this 
sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national 
strength . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
67 Id. at 513 (alteration omitted) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F. 2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 
1966)). 
68 Id. at 513–14. 
69 Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011). The panel opinion had cited to Tinker itself in the preceding paragraph. 
Id. 
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deferential to the school’s expressive interests. Note, for example, 
that the panel asserted only that the plaintiff’s speech interfered with 
the school’s expressive interest in cheering on its athletic teams70 
rather than identifying any threatened disorder or disruption to 
“schoolwork or discipline” of the sort identified in Tinker as an 
interest sufficient to justify regulation of student speech on school 
premises.71 Whether a school’s interest in protecting its own 
expression—here, an interest in cheering for its sports teams—is ever 
sufficient to justify the punishment of student speech under Tinker 
remains a substantial question that the Fifth Circuit did not address. 
Even if a school’s interest in cheering for its athletic teams could 
be considered sufficiently weighty to satisfy Tinker, the Fifth Circuit 
offered no discussion—much less required any showing—that she 
“material[ly] and substantial[ly] interfere[d]”72 with that interest: she 
did not curse, yell at, or cheer against the athlete nor did she cheer for 
the other team. She simply remained silent. A thoughtful analysis in 
this case—and a fair application of Tinker’s rigorous scrutiny—would 
have considered whether her silence, without more, materially and 
substantially interfered with the school’s interests.  
C. Analysis under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court crafted a more deferential rule 
that applies to “expressive activities that students, parents, and 
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school.”73 There it distinguished schools’ 
regulation of student speech on school premises generally (e.g., the 
type of regulation rigorously scrutinized in Tinker) from schools’ 
efforts to avoid being inaccurately perceived as promoting or 
sponsoring student speech:  
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a 
student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the 
school premises. The latter question concerns educators’ 
                                                                                                                 
70 Id. 
71 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
72 Id. Tinker requires that schools prove that the student speech to be regulated actually 
cause, or reasonably be forecast to cause, material and substantial disorder or disruption. Id. at 
514. 
73 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); see also Morse, 127 S. 
Ct. at 2627 (“[Hazelwood] does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe 
that Frederick’s banner bore the school’s imprimatur.”); id. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(characterizing Hazelwood as “allow[ing] a school to regulate what is in essence the school’s 
own speech, that is, articles that appear in a publication that is an official school organ”). 
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authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical 
productions, and other expressive activities that students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive 
to bear the imprimatur of the school.74 
The Court then interpreted the First Amendment to permit schools to 
“exercis[e] editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”75 
In developing such a rule, the Hazelwood Court sought to protect 
schools’ power to “assure that participants learn whatever lessons the 
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed 
to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and 
that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed 
to the school.”76 It then applied its new rule to uphold as 
constitutional a school’s refusal to publish articles in its newspaper 
discussing student experiences with birth control, pregnancy, and 
divorce.77 
Although its extremely cursory discussion does not makes its 
mode(s) of analysis clear, the Silsbee court’s statement that the school 
had no duty to “promote” the plaintiff’s speech78 appears to invoke 
the deferential Hazelwood test.79 But none of the Hazelwood Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
74 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
75 Id. at 273. The Hazelwood Court identified the school’s pedagogical concerns over 
newspaper articles on students’ experience with birth control, pregnancy, and divorce to include 
student and family privacy, journalistic fairness, and readers’ maturity. Id. at 274–75. 
76 Id. at 271 (“A school may “disassociate itself . . . from speech that is, for example, 
ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, 
or unsuitable for immature audiences.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Some 
of the Supreme Court’s other student speech cases also signal its concern that schools not be 
misunderstood as endorsing views that may be antithetical to their chosen educational mission. 
See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2618 (2007) (crediting concern that a principal’s 
failure to discipline the plaintiff’s speech “would send a powerful message to the students in her 
charge, including Frederick, about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug 
use”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (“[I]t was perfectly 
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech 
and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school 
education.”).  
77 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
78 Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist., 402 F. App’x 852, 855 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3514 (2011). The panel cited Hazelwood as support. Id.  
79 To be sure, government has a significant interest in protecting the integrity of its own 
expression—i.e., in ensuring that it is held politically responsible only for its own views, and not 
those of others mistakenly attributed to it. See Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government’s 
Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1347 
(2004) (“First Amendment values are not frustrated by government efforts to protect its 
expression that deprive a private speaker of only the opportunity to speak in a setting that 
mistakenly conveys the government’s endorsement of his or her speech, while leaving the 
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concerns appears to be implicated in Silsbee: neither the school nor 
the Fifth Circuit identified any way in which the plaintiff’s speech 
interfered with learning or any other pedagogical goal, exposed any 
observer to inappropriate speech, or misled reasonable onlookers to 
interpret her silence as reflecting the school’s views.  
More specifically, the deferential Hazelwood rule first requires a 
determination that reasonable onlookers will likely misattribute the 
student’s speech to the school, as the Hazelwood Court appropriately 
recognized schools’ interest in ensuring that “the views of the 
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”80 To 
be sure, a school’s efforts to educate are too easily undermined if it 
cannot ensure that contrary private opinions are not mistakenly 
assigned to it. But this interest is only threatened when the school can 
demonstrate its reasonable concern that others’ speech will be 
mistakenly understood as its own. Consider, for example, a student’s 
non-disruptive replies to a teacher’s in-class questions in which the 
student expresses opinions inconsistent with the school’s views on 
certain matters. No one would interpret the student’s speech as 
bearing the school’s imprimatur simply because it occurred in the 
context of the classroom—i.e., school-sponsored curricular speech. 
For this reason, a thoughtful application of Hazelwood would 
certainly permit the teacher or any school official to disagree with or 
otherwise rebut the student’s speech through counter-speech—but not 
to punish the student for her dissenting views when they posed no 
danger of being mistakenly attributed to the school.81  
                                                                                                                 
 
speaker free to deliver the same message elsewhere.”). The Supreme Court has yet to consider, 
and thus the lower courts have yet to work out, the relationship between its Hazelwood rule and 
the more recent emergence of its government speech doctrine—even though both involve 
attention to government’s expressive interests. For scholarly treatment of the issue, see Alan 
Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos 
of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 722 
(2009) (arguing that school-sponsored activities should be characterized as a “nonforum”—a 
new category “located on the free speech doctrinal continuum between the nonpublic forum and 
government speech”—and not subject to free speech clause scrutiny); Casarez, supra note 61, at 
1 (proposing a “hybrid speech analysis” to balance the interests of individual and government 
speakers in school-sponsored activities, as well as in public employment). 
80 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
81 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The opinion of the Court does 
not endorse the broad argument advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First 
Amendment permits public school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a 
school’s ‘educational mission.’ . . . [S]ome public schools have defined their educational 
missions as including the inculcation of whatever political and social views are held by [school 
officials and faculty].”). 
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What are the dangers that the Silsbee plaintiff’s opinions would be 
mistakenly attributed to the school? On one hand, the plaintiff was 
“on duty” as a cheerleader in a school uniform at a school-sponsored 
athletic event.82 On the other hand, she simply remained silent; she 
did not cheer against the athlete nor for the other team. Under the 
circumstances, the likelihood that reasonable onlookers would 
interpret her silence as reflecting the school’s views remains 
unexamined and unproven.83  
A thoughtful analysis under Hazelwood would have considered 
whether the plaintiff’s silence in this context would mislead 
reasonable observers into assigning certain views to the school. But 
rather than carefully considering whether her speech posed any threat 
to the school’s expressive interests by leading viewers inaccurately to 
attribute her views to the school, the Fifth Circuit instead simply 
assumed threats to those interests.84  
CONCLUSION 
The government’s expressive claims in these cases are potentially 
breathtaking in scope, as they assert the power to punish private 
parties’ speech that does not threaten the government’s ability to 
express its own views. Even more troubling, some lower courts 
permit government entities to exercise this power, deferring to the 
government’s assertions that the plaintiffs’ speech endangers its own 
expressive interests.  
But other lower courts resist these arguments, recognizing that a 
meaningful commitment to free speech instead requires skepticism of 
the government’s expressive claims unless and until the government 
can persuade us that its efforts are not a pretext for squelching private 
                                                                                                                 
82 For a discussion of the circumstances under which a public employee’s speech might 
reasonably be understood as bearing the imprimatur of his or her governmental employer, see 
Norton, supra note 13, at 47–67. 
83 For a discussion of how onlookers use a variety of “source cues” to determine the 
source of a message, see Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying 
Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 607–09 (2008). 
84 Finally, even if the school could show the danger of such misattribution, Hazelwood 
still requires that the school show that its action in dismissing the student was “reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. The school made no 
such argument, see Brief of Appellee, Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist. 402 F. App’x 852 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-41075), and the Fifth Circuit discussed none. Id.  
Another unresolved issue—although not one in play in Silsbee—is whether Hazelwood 
permits schools to engage in viewpoint-based distinctions in addressing their pedagogical 
concerns. See, e.g., Samuel P. Jordan, Comment, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored 
Student Speech: Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (explaining 
the circuit split on whether Hazelwood creates a constitutional exception allowing viewpoint 
restrictions on student expression for pedagogical purposes). 
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dissent.85 Which trend will prevail depends on how carefully we think 
about the circumstances under which private speech actually threatens 
the government’s expressive interests. Respect for First Amendment 
values should caution us to be slow to imagine such threats.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
85 For additional examples of lower courts skeptical of government’s asserted expressive 
interests, see Norton & Citron, supra note 8, at 917, 929–30; Norton, supra note 8, at 537–42, 
546–47. 
